Irregular Warfare Podcast

Description

Episode 160 examines the origins of Britain’s World War II commandos and the enduring role of special operations forces from Churchill’s era to today.

Summary

This episode explores the creation of Britain’s legendary commando force following the military disasters of 1940. Author Monty Halls and retired Lieutenant General Scott Howell trace how a remote house in the Scottish Highlands became the laboratory for a new kind of warrior – one selected for grit, initiative, adaptability, and the ability to operate independently under extreme pressure. 

The conversation examines how early commando raids sought to restore British morale, create uncertainty in the German high command, divert enemy forces, and achieve strategic effects disproportionate to the number of troops involved. The discussion then connects these experiences to modern special operations forces, including their relationship with the conventional military, the importance of joint and combined operations, the risks of overrelying on raids as an easy policy option, and the challenge of adapting SOF for cyber, space, drones, and future large-scale conflicts. Throughout, the episode asks how military institutions can protect their mavericks, preserve disciplined initiative, and innovate before battlefield failure forces them to change.

Takeaways

Britain created its commando force after conventional doctrine and military institutions failed to meet the crisis of 1940.

Inverailort House became an experimental training ground where unconventional leaders developed the culture and methods of the early commandos.

Small special operations units can create strategic effects by disrupting adversaries, creating uncertainty, diverting forces, and influencing political decision-making.

The psychological impact of commando raids often exceeded their immediate tactical results.

Early raids frequently failed, demonstrating that courage and audacity cannot substitute for intelligence, training, planning, and joint support.

Special operations forces are most effective when their missions support a broader military and political strategy rather than becoming the strategy themselves.

The characteristics sought in World War II commandos – grit, initiative, adaptability, discipline, and comfort with uncertainty – remain central to SOF selection today.

Unconventional thinking does not mean abandoning standards, accountability, or good order and discipline.

Decentralized special operations require exceptional junior leaders who can exercise independent judgment without losing sight of strategic objectives or ethical boundaries.

SOF organizations need political and bureaucratic advocates who can protect experimentation, secure resources, and connect unconventional forces to senior decision-makers.

Modern special operations forces must maintain close ties with the conventional services and be prepared to enable the broader joint force in large-scale conflict.

Future operators will need to integrate traditional military skills with cyber, space, drones, influence activities, intelligence capabilities, and rapidly changing technology.

Success can make military organizations resistant to change, so leaders should deliberately build forces and concepts capable of making today’s successful models obsolete.

Policymakers should understand what special operations forces can and cannot accomplish and avoid treating them as an inexpensive solution to every strategic problem.

Military institutions should protect their mavericks, encourage disciplined experimentation, and adapt before the cost of failure is paid in blood.

Lieutenant General Scott Howell is a retired U.S. Air Force officer who served as the Commanding General of Joint Special Operations Command the the Vice Commander of US Special Operations Command. His experience includes senior leadership in Air Force special operations and extensive work with joint and allied special operations forces.

Monty Halls is the author of Churchill’s Killing House: The Origins of World War II’s Legendary Commando Fighting Force. A former Royal Marine, he has worked with members of the British and allied special operations communities and has written extensively about the history and modern role of the Royal Marines and commandos.

Kyle Atwell is the host for episode 160. Please reach out to him with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Photo: Cover image generated using AI-assisted digital art tools.

Description

Episode 159 examines the relationship between alliances, military access, and U.S. global power projection. 

Summary

This episode explores an often overlooked benefit of alliances: wartime access. Dr. Rachel Metz and Ambassador Douglas Lute explain why public debates about allies often focus narrowly on defense spending, while missing the basing, overflight, logistics, intelligence, and political permissions that make U.S. global power possible.

The conversation examines how allies and partners enable American military reach, why states may grant, restrict, or deny access, and how domestic politics, retaliation risks, technological change, and shifting global power dynamics can make access harder to secure in future crises. The discussion also considers recent examples from NATO, the Persian Gulf, and Ukraine to show why access is not automatic, why it is a burden allies often bear, and why the United States may need to rethink how it plans, consults, and sustains its alliance relationships.

Takeaways

Alliances are often judged by burden sharing, but access may be one of their most important strategic benefits.

Access includes permission to operate from another state’s land, ports, airspace, territorial waters, or infrastructure.

Wartime access allows the United States to project power far from home and sustain operations over time.

Allied access helps mitigate the “tyranny of distance” and makes distant theaters militarily reachable.

The United States often takes access for granted, but allies and partners can grant, restrict, or deny it.

Domestic politics can shape whether a state allows U.S. forces to operate from its territory.

Lack of consultation can make allies less willing to support U.S. military operations, especially in wars they view as optional or offensive.

Access itself can be a form of burden sharing, because host nations may absorb political, economic, and military risks.

Drones, missiles, cyberattacks, sabotage, and other emerging technologies and asymmetric threats may make hosting U.S. forces more costly for allies and partners.

Planners should “play green” in exercises and wargames rather than assuming allied access will always be available.

U.S. alliances remain a major geostrategic advantage over Russia and China, but that advantage requires active investment and consultation.

Ambassador Douglas Lute served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2017. A retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General, he served in senior national security roles across multiple administrations. He is a co-signer of a joint statement by 16 U.S. Ambassadors to NATO and Supreme Allied Commanders titled, “NATO is Vital to U.S. National Security.”

Dr. Rachel Metz is an Assistant Professor at The George Washington University. She wrote the article this episode focuses on: “Allies and Access: Implications of an American Turn Away from Alliances,” coauthored with Austin Carson and Paul Poast. Her work examines alliances, military cooperation, wartime access, and the conditions under which states allow foreign militaries to operate from their territory.

Kyle Atwell is the host for episode 159. Please reach out to him with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Photo: Cover image generated using AI-assisted digital art tools.

Nuclear weapons may make direct war between major powers less likely, but they do not end competition. Instead, they push states toward indirect forms of conflict: proxy warfare, security force assistance, covert action, and cyber operations.

The guests discuss why indirect conflict is so attractive in an era of nuclear risk, how this logic applies to Ukraine and Taiwan, and what it means for US-China competition. They also consider whether the United States is adequately preparing for the kinds of conflicts it is most likely to face: not large-scale conventional wars, but persistent competition through indirect conflict. The academic foundation for the episode is the following article: Kyle Atwell and David Logan (2026), “Shadow Wars in the Shadow of the Bomb: The Link Between Nuclear Weapons and Indirect Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution.

General Richard D. Clarke, US Army, retired, served as the twelfth commander of US Special Operations Command. He previously served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, commandant of cadets at West Point, and director of operations at Joint Special Operations Command.

Dr. David Logan is an assistant professor in security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His research focuses on nuclear weapons, arms control, deterrence, and the US-China security relationship.

Dr. Kyle Atwell is an Army Special Forces officer and co-founder and chair of the board of the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He is a former assistant professor at West Point and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Alexandra Chinchilla is the host for this episode. Please reach out to her with any questions about the episode or IWI.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

This episode examines why the United States has failed at irregular warfare and what it would take to reverse that trajectory—not merely to deter, but to actually win. 

Summary

While irregular warfare is on the rise around the globe today, the United States has largely failed at irregular warfare over the past 75 years. Key issues our guests identify include a military oriented for conventional war, inconsistent knowledge and education about irregular warfare, as well as the lack of a dedicated US government organization that can increase interagency cooperation along with a focus on preparing the operational environment. The guests discuss the resilience and resistance model as a way of thinking about politics, with every state having some element of both resistance and resilience. Understanding these tensions within states reveals opportunities for US foreign policy to work with partners and undermine adversaries. Finally, the episode closes with a discussion of irregular warfare in deterrence and competition.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles T. Cleveland is a native of Arizona and a 1978 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. His military career included distinguished assignments, most notably Commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (Task Force Viking), Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as Commanding General of Special Operations Command Central, before culminating as the three-star Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012-2015. In that position, he led the overhaul of U.S. Army Special Operations, which improved the effectiveness and training levels of existing units, built needed capability, and improved relationships within the Army, across other government agencies, in Congress, and among international Special Operations Forces partners.

Dr. Rob Burrell is a Senior Research Fellow with Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. From 2020-2024, he taught irregular warfare at Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired Marine and has a PhD in history from the University of Warwick. A prominent expert on resistance and resilience, he is the lead author of the first textbook on irregular warfare Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Competition, Deterrence, and Irregular Warfare (Joint Special Operations University Press 2025) which forms the basis for today’s episode.

Alexandra Chinchilla and Kyle Atwell are the hosts for episode 157. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Description

Episode 156 examines what the U.S.-Iran War and Russia-Ukraine War reveal about how weaker states and irregular actors contest navies, maritime commerce, and global energy flows.

Summary

This conversation examines naval irregular warfare in an era of drones, shadow fleets, contested chokepoints, and attacks on commercial shipping. The guests explore why the maritime domain is attractive to weaker states and irregular actors, comparing Iran’s approach in the Strait of Hormuz, Ukraine’s campaign in the Black Sea, and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. They also discuss ghost fleets, sanctions enforcement, and the risks of mixing warfighting, law enforcement, and freedom of navigation. Throughout, they emphasize that technology matters most when paired with ingenuity, strategy, and a clear end state.

Takeaways

Naval irregular warfare is not new; mines, small boats, commerce raiding, deception, and coastal attacks have long been part of maritime competition.

Unmanned systems, cheap sensors, long-range fires, spoofing, and commercial data add new layers to older maritime threats.

The maritime domain is attractive to irregular actors because trade, energy, food, communications, ports, and undersea infrastructure are difficult to defend and easy to disrupt.

Commercial shipping can be as strategically important as naval forces because disrupting trade can create economic and political effects far beyond the immediate battlefield.

Chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal allow relatively small actions to generate disproportionate global consequences.

Ukraine’s Black Sea campaign shows that a state without a conventional surface fleet can still contest the sea by integrating drones, missiles, intelligence, targeting, and adaptation.

Iran’s maritime strategy relies on asymmetric tools such as small boats, mines, drones, dark shipping, proxy-enabled experimentation, and the threat of disruption in confined waters.

Ghost fleets, spoofed vessel tracking, reflagging, sanctions evasion, and maritime interdiction create hard legal and operational problems for the United States and its allies.

Boarding suspect vessels is not enough; policymakers need a clear legal basis, a clear “then what,” and a strategy that does not undermine freedom of navigation.

U.S. and allied navies need to focus on threat tactics as much as threat technologies, especially the combined use of drones, missiles, mines, small boats, and commercial vessels.

Platform flexibility, modularity, amphibious capacity, and agile force design may matter as much as any single new technology or class of unmanned system.

Tactical success does not equal strategic success. Shooting down drones or destroying vessels matters only if it helps keep seas open and achieves the larger political objective.

Dr. Ben Connable is the Executive Director of the Battle Research Group, an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an on-call principal research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses. A retired Marine Corps intelligence and Middle East foreign area officer, he previously served as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and is the author of Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War.

Dr. Ian M. Ralby is president of Auxilium Worldwide and founder and CEO of I.R. Consilium. He is a leading expert on maritime law, maritime security, ocean governance, maritime domain awareness, hybrid aggression, lawfare, and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. His work supports governments and international organizations confronting piracy, trafficking, smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other maritime security challenges.

Kyle Atwell and Alisa Laufer are the hosts for episode 156. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Photo: AI-generated photo illustration created for the Irregular Warfare Podcast. The image is illustrative and does not depict an actual event, vessel, or operation.